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A Proposed Amendment to the Constitution;
Senate Joint Resolution 130
The paramount issue to be discussed in this comment is the preservation
of the ultimate authority of the Constitution.1 Because of recent concepts of
international law, it is possible for the constitutional supremacy to be surrendered
by treaty, e.g., become subservient to the United Nations Charter. There is a
real possibility that because of a generous treaty power-Art. II, sec. 2, cl. 2,2 and
Art. VI, cl. 23-the rights and freedoms of the American people protected by
the Constitution can be entirely altered, and that the legal relationship of the
States to their federal government can be abridged by treaty.'
An effort is being made to re-define the treaty power to prevent its possible
use as an instrument amounting to domestic legislation. This effort has resulted
in Senate Joint Resolution 130, which is a proposed amendment to the U. S.
Constitution. Sixty of the ninety-six members of the United States Senate have
united behind this resolution.'
Section 1 of S. J. Res. 130 provides that no treaty shall abridge the free
exercise of rights enumerated in the Constitution." This provision would prohibit
the making of treaties in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
of the United States. The purpose of such a provision is to curb what the
American Bar Association terms a dangerous constitutional loophole.7  For ex-
planation of the term "loophole", we need to refer to the Constitution. Art.
VI, par. 2, requires that laws be made "in pursuance" of the Constitution.
However, treaties need only be made "under the authority of the United States."
Advocates of S. J. Res. 130, and the American Bar Association point out that
a loophole exists because there is no deterrent, e.g., such as the words "in pursu-
ance" of the Constitution to check the treaty power. An additional definition
can also be given in the words of one of the chief sponsors of the proposed
amendment:
1S. J. Res. 130, 82nd Cong. (1952), Sec. 1, infra, note 6.
2 "He (the President) shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur."
3 "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, and any Thing in the Constitution or the Laws of any State
to the Contrary notwithstanding."
4 Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, on S. J. Res. 130, 82nd
Cong. 2nd Sess. (1952).
5Resolution, note 1.
" Sec. 1. No treaty or executive agreement shall be made respecting the rights of
citizens of the United States protected by this Constitution, or abridging or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof.
7A.B.A. Report of Standing Committee on Peace and War Through United Nations,
pp. 4-18, Mar. 15, 1952.
"This constitutional loophole arises from Article VI of the Constitution which
makes treaties the supreme law of the land. The treaty-making power is
unlimited in scope. Moreover, treaties, unlike Acts of Congress, are not
subject to the phrase 'in pursuance' of the Constitution as a condition to their
becoming the supreme law. No provision of any treaty has ever been held
unconstitutional."
8
Section two of S. J. Res. 1301 "is designed to prevent United States partici-
pation in world or regional government by treaty or executive agreement."'"
Advocates of the resolution say the revolutionary goals should have the approval
of the people.
Section three of S. J. Res. 130 would make all treaties inoperative as internal
law pending approval by both houses of Congress." This third section and the
foregoing two sections comprise the more controversial portions of the proposed
amendment. They are designed to plug the "loophole.'
12
The constitutional loophole springs from recent innovations in international
law which are so vast that they no longer operate merely between nation and
nation, but extend to the internal affairs of our nation.13 One of these is that
there is no longer any distinction between domestic and foreign affairs. This
innovation results from the utilization of a treaty as an instrument of legislation
in internal affairs.14  There is a glaring lack of demarcation between the use
of a treaty for external international matters and its use in internal domestic
affairs of our nation.'5 There are those who contend that the constitutional rights
of the American people are appropriate subjects of treaty negotiation." Those
who follow this line of thought deny that "the Charter's provisions on human
rights have not been incorporated into the municipal law of the United States
so as to supersede inconsistent State legislation because they are not self-executing
(underscoring by the writer)."'" This language of Manley 0. Hudson refers
to Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter which are as follows:
The United Nations shall promote universal respect for, and observance of,
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to
race, sex, language or religion.' 8
8 Cong. Digest, Vol. 31, No. 11, p. 268, Nov. 1952.
9 Sec. 2. No treaty or executive agreement shall vest in any international organization
or in any foreign power any of the legislative, executive, or judicial powers vested in this
Constitution in the Congress, the President, and in the courts of the United States,
respectively. See also, Hearings, supra, at 27.
'OId. at 270.
"Sec. 3. No treaty or executive agreement shall alter or abridge the laws of the
United States or the Constitution or the laws of the several States unless, and then only
to the extent that, Congress shall provide by act or joint resolution.
"2Cong. Digest, supra.
13 State Dept. Publication 3972 (1950).
14 Allen, The Treaty as an Instrument of Legislation (1952).
15 Ibid.
16Wright, National Courts and Human Rights, 45 Am. J. Int. Law 62 (1950).
Moskowitz, Is the United Nation's Bill of Human Rights Dangerous? 35 A.B.A.J. 283,
285 (1949).
1 Hudson, Charter Provisions on Human Rights in American Law, 44 Am. J. Int.
Law, 543 (1950).
'8 U.N. Charter 59 Star. 1031 (1945).
All members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation
with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in
Article 55.19
It is not to be denied that a Treaty which is spelled out in detail and made
under the authority of the United States is both self-executing and the supreme
law of the land.20  But it is equally strongly established that a Treaty couched
in such broad language as Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter does not purport to
operate of and by itself, that implementing legislation is needed before the
Treaty is executed.21  The provisions in the Charter set forth broad aims and
objectives in promoting observance of the fundamental freedoms. They are
framed as a promise of future action.
22
Serious consideration is timely. As one writer states, "... the United Nations
and its affiliated organizations have proposed over two hundred treaties . . .
in the social, economic and political field.
'" 2
Recent decisions have had their impact upon the judicial mind; and such
decisions were influenced very definitely by the "moral commitments" of the
United Nations Charter.24  It is important to recognize that the Supreme Court
of California in its decision of April 17, 1952 (reversing the District Court
of Appeals) in Fujii v. California does not give the United Nations Charter
controlling effect. However, it would appear that the Charter projected itself
into the thinking of the court in a new construction of the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to the extent that earlier decisions upon
identical law that have stood the test of time have now been swept away.2"
Although the aims and objectives of the Charter are undoubtedly highly
desirable, there is still solid reasoning upon which to base an examination of the
legal means which some would seek to employ to attain these objectives.
When the Constitution was framed, international law was universally looked
upon as dealing with external affairs among nations. Richard Henry Lee and
Patrick Henry, both of Virginia, strongly objected to the treaty clause at the time
of its adoption. These two great Americans feared that the treaty power
would be used to affect the internal affairs of this nation. Although Jefferson,
by reason of his ambassadorship to France, did not in his absence, partake of
this treaty clause discussion as a member of the Constitutional Convention, he
did have this to say:
19 Id.
20 Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall 199 (U.S. 1794). Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet 253 (1829).
21 Fellows v. Blacksmith, et al, 19 How 366 (1856).
22 Gibson, J., Fujii v. California, 242 P. 2d 617 (1952).
28 Deutsch, The Need for a Treaty Amendment: A Restatement and a Reply, 38
A.B.A.J. 735, Sept., 1952.
24Fujii v. California, 242 P. 2d 617 (1952. See review in 38 A.B.A.J. 559, July
1952. Perez v. Lippold, 198 P. 2d 17 (1948); Power County Press, American Falls,
Idaho, June 19, 1952, p. 4; reprinted in Congr. Rec., June 24, 1952, p. A4169.
25 In re Fujii, supra note 22.
By the general power to make treaties, the Constitution must have intended to
comprehend only those objects which are usually regulated by treaties, and
cannot be otherwise regulated.
It must have meant to except out all those rights reserved to the states; for
surely the President and the Senate cannot do by treaty what the whole
government is interdicted from doing in any way.
26
Thus, the founding fathers did have an insight into the Constitutional loophole
whereby the balance between the State and federal power could be upset by the
exercise of treaty power.
27
Contrast with this balance of power the primary weakness of the forerunner
of the Constitution-the Articles of Confederation. Under this latter document,
although Congress had the power to enter into treaties and alliances, it could not
compel their observance by the States. The veto power which each State enjoyed
operated as a dynamic deterrent to the establishment of satisfactory relations with
foreign countries for the national good.28  The Constitution was so framed that
the central government should have the sole power to deal with other nations.
The question then posed by the framers of the Constitution was how to provide
for the exercise of the treaty power without making it cumbersome and im-
practical. The choice narrowed to action by the President and Senate. Madison,
Jay, and Hamilton, all proponents of the supremacy clause, had prevailed.
2 9
From their deliberations we can gather that the new treaty power was not to be
extended to matters of purely domestic concern for which it was never intended. 0
Today, a way has been found to change the rights guaranteed by the Con-
stitution, without changing the Constitution.2 1  The generous grant of treaty
power, implanted by the founding fathers in our Constitution for the purpose
of making a new nation fully sovereign, has now come to mean, for some, a
means of legislation for states by treaty.2 By a treaty fiat, the balance of rights
reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment should not be upset. 32 It is
rather ironical that the treaty power which was meant to make this new nation
fully sovereign, can now come to be the means through which it can lose its
Constitutional supremacy.
8 4
26Jefferson, Manual of Parliamentary Practice; 2 Farrand, Records of the Federal
Convention (Rev. Ed. 1937) p. 370; see also 3 Farrand 136, 286-287; 1 Farrand 164,
245; 2 Farrand 297.
27 Ibid.
28 See Journal of Continental Congress, 1774-1789, XXXII, pp. 124, 181-182. See,
Myers, Treaty and Law Under the Constitution. Dept. of State Bulletin, p. 371, Mar. 10,
1952.
29 Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention, 1911 Ed. Vol. 3, pp. 162, 166,
251-252, 347-349, 523.
30 Ibid.
81 Holman, Treaty Law-Making: A Blank Check for Writing a New Constitution
(1950), 36 A.B.A.J. 707. See also, Holman, Treaty Law-Making, 25 Wash. L. Rev.
382 (1950).
32 Id. at 709.
33 Cong. Digest, note 8, at 284-286.
84 See note 8 supra, at 270-272.
Chief Justice Holmes declared in Missouri v. Holland
".... acts of Congress are the supreme law of the land only when made in
pursuance of the Constitution, while treaties are declared to be so when made
when under the authority of the United States. It is open to question whether
the authority of the United States means more than the formal acts prescribed
to make the convention. We do not mean to imply that there are no qualifica-
tions to the treaty-making power; but they must be ascertained in a different
way. It is obvious that there may be matters of the sharpest exigency for the
national well being that an act of Congress could not deal with, but a treaty
followed by such an act could, and it is not lightly to be assumed that in
matters requiring national action 'a power which must belong to and some-
where reside in every civilized government' is not to be found." 3 5
Under a treaty, Congress, by virtue of Art. I, sec. 8, can pass all laws
necessary and proper to implement treaties,36 even though, in the absence of such
treaty, Congress would not have power under the Constitution to pass such
legislation.3 7  This power is not to be denied if Congress chooses to make use
of it. There is actually nothing new in the holding that the treaty power prevails
over the reserved powers of the states.38 But such a holding has not been construed
as an invasion of the right of a state to control its land, or state police powers,
or affairs of state having a strictly internal function.3 9
In Missouri v. Holland, a federal statute protecting migratory birds, which
had been passed to implement a treaty with Great Britain on behalf of Canada,
was held constitutional by virtue of treaty power, although a similar federal
statute passed before the treaty had been held unconstitutional (by lower courts)
as dealing with a subject matter over which no power in the legislative field had
been delegated to Congress by the Constitution.4 0  This same treaty principle
was reaffirmed in Asakura v. City of Seattle, wherein a treaty was held to have
overridden a city ordinance.41  In exercising legislative powers, Congress is
expressly confined by the Tenth Amendment to the subject matter enumerated
in Art. I, sec. 8; whereas, in exercising the treaty powers granted by Art. I, sec. 2,
cl. 2, the President and Senate are not limited with regard to subjects which may
be dealt with in treaties. These constitutional provisions, plus the "necessary
and proper" clause, produce the conclusion reached in Missouri v. Holland.
42
35 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
86 Ibid.
87 This statement represents the agreed views of the American Bar Association's
Committee. See report of Committee on Peace and Law, Sept. 1, 1951, p. 36.
88In Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall 199 (1796), it was held that certain provisions of the
treaty ending the Revolutionary War were self-executing, and being inconsistent with a
Virginia state law, held superseded it.
39Terrence v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 225 (1922).
40252 U.S. 416 (1920).
41265 U.S. 332 (1924).
42 Supra note 42.
See also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corporation, 299 U.S. 304, 316-19 (1936).
U.S. Const., Art. 1, sec. 8. The inclusion of the so-called "necessary and proper"
clause was a recognition that the subject matter of treaties might transcend the specific
powers delegated to Congress, and that it was in the national interest that Congress be
able to enact legislation implementing a treaty which it would be unable to enact in the
absence of a treaty. It followed as a corollary that the Supreme Court would hold, as it
did in Missouri v. Holland, that Congress in implementing treaties might enact legisla-
tion which was beyond its ordinary delegated powers.
It is at precisely this point of the legal process of treaty development that
United States Senator John W. Bricker,43 Frank E. Holman,44 past president of
the American Bar Association, and William Fleming,45 a layman, have all ex-
pressed concern about the present views of some to extend treaty making powers
to internal affairs of the States.4 6  These advocates of a constitutional amend-
ment-to make treaties dealing with internal affairs subject to vote by both
houses of Congress-allege that it has taken approximately 150 years for the
constitutional loophole to attain menacing proportions. They reiterate that, when
the Constitution was framed, international law was universally recognized as
limited to the nation's external affairs only. They hasten to point out that the
basic premise of proposed new international law is that relationship among
citizens of a government, and between the individual and the government are
appropriate subjects of a treaty. Therefore, proposed legislation to place domestic
affairs beyond the range of treaty power has found its way into Congress.47
There is a thread of dictum running through opinions of the Supreme Court
of the United States which says "that a treaty cannot change the Constitution
or be held valid if it be in violation of that instrument; 4 that the treaty power,
as expressed in the Constitution", is limited "by those restraints which are found
in that instrument," and does not extend "so far as to authorize what the
Constitution forbids; '" ' and that it remains "subject to prohibitions within that
Constitution." But in the latest opinion of the Supreme Court on the subject
matter, this thread has been snapped.5" For it was in Missouri v. Holland that
the Supreme Court declared that "it is obvious that there may be matters of the
sharpest exigency for the national well-being that an act of Congress could not
deal with but that a treaty followed by such an act could." It is against this
concept, with its inherent dangers that writers have expressed alarm.51 Nor has
any satisfaction and peace of mind been expressed because of limitation imposed
by Art. II, par. 752 of the United Nations Charter which forbids the United
Nations from interfering in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
of its members. The novel concept that once the United Nations has started
43Senate Joint Resolution 130, 82nd Congress. A.B.A. Report of Standing Committee
on Peace and Law Through the United Nations, Feb. 1, 1952.
4Ibid.
45 98 Cong. Record 924 (Feb. 7, 1952). See also, Fleming, Danger to America:
The Draft Covenant on Human Rights, 37 A.B.A.J. 739-742, 816-820, 855-860 (1951).
46Hearings before Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, on S. J. Res. 130,
82nd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1952).
47 Hearings, supra.
48 Cherokee Tobacco v. United States, 11 Wall. 616, 620-621 (U.S. 1871).
49De Geo roy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890). Asakura v. City of Seattle,
265 U.S. 332, 341 (1941).
50 Amaya v. Stanolind Oil and Gas Co., 158 F. 2d 544, 556 (C.A. 5th 1947).
51 Missouri v. Holland, supra.
Deutsch, The Treaty Making Clause; A Decision for the People of America, 37
A.B.A.J. 659 (1951).
52 "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the U.N. to intervene
in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall
require the members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter."
to act, the issue ceases to be a domestic issue has caused great criticism.? The
advocates of amendment say that the United Nations has ignored this limitation
of its power. 4 With a sharp eye to the future, one part of the American Bar
Association proposal for amendment to the Constitution is as follows:
A provision of a treaty which conflicts with any provision of this Constitu-
tion shall not be of any force or effect.
55
Zacharia Chafee, one of the opponents of a Constitutional amendment, states
that Art. II, par. 756 of the Charter merely refers to the compulsory powers of
the United Nations; it does not, he says, wipe out the long practice of nations
to make treaties which alter laws within their domestic jurisdiction. Further-
more, it is urged by him that all this concern about a Constitutional amendment
is quite unnecessary,17 that the present treaty enforcing machinery, Art. II, sec. 2,
cl. 2 of the Constitution, is quite adequate and ample enough to provide a
remedy against the risk from treaties." Chafee is not alone. 
He has many
co-advocates whose general views result in the following conclusions:
1. The assumption is unwarranted that the President, the Senate and some
of the Courts would abuse the treaty power and alienate the constitutional
liberalties of American citizens.
2. S. J. Res. 130 is not clear, as now drafted.
3. S. J. Res. 130 would seriously handicap this nation in dealing in foreign
relations.
4. That this resolution would alter the fundamental division of power
between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches.-5
This type of thinking has been converted into action (consider the two
hundred or more treaties pending in the United Nations, note 23) by those
who look upon implementation of the United Nations Charter-particularly
Articles 55 and 56-"as a continuing process", wherein most of the human rights
provisions can be taken care of by federal or state legislation without reference
to treaty. The argument is made by Chafee that the proposed Covenant of Human
Rights is only a minimum set of standards which domestic legislation can imple-
ment. This is in keeping with the view that constitutional amendment is therefore
unnecessary."0
CONCLUSION
Two well defined and opposed groups have developed in this country re-
garding the desirability of a constitutional amendment making all treaties and
53 Cong. Digest, note 8, at 280.
54 Id.
55 A.B.A. Report of Standing Committee on Peace and Law Through United Nations,
Mar. 15, 1952.5 8 Note 52.
57 Cong. Digest, note 8, at 281-283.
68 Chafee, Stop Being Terrified of Treaties: Stop Being Scared of the Constitution,
38 A.B.A.J. 731 (1952).
15 Cong. Digest, note 8, at 273.
6 Chafee, Amending the Constitution to Cripple Treaties, 12 La. L. Rev. 345 (1952).
49
executive agreements non self-executing."1 Proponents of such an amendment to
the Constitution look upon the treaty provision of Art. VI, cl. 2 as a loophole by
which treaties and executive agreements might be used to change the internal
law of the United States,6 2 and even extend to the changing of our form of
government. 63  Opponents warn that an amendment will diminish the ability of
the government of the United States to carry out its agreements with other
nations. 4
What then can or should be done? The American Bar Association Section
of International and Comparative Law has had this to say:
We concur in the wisdom of further study of the proposed amendment, but
we of the Section committee are not convinced of the necessity, nor of the
correctness of its proposed terms to carry out the announced purpose.
65
In view of the diametrically opposed groups and the conflict in treaty con-
cepts, patient and mature deliberations are in order. It is the avowed purpose
of the advocates of the proposed amendment to stimulate discussion and to focus
attention on these complex issues of international and constitutional law in order
to preserve our Constitution.
JOHN M. KEARNEY
61 See Con Arguments, Cong. Digest, note 8.
62 See Pro Arguments, Cong. Digest, note 8.
63 Tucker, Limitations on the Treaty-Making Power (1951). See also, Wilson, 28
Harvard L. Rev. 826 (1915).
64 Chafee, Federal and State Powers Under the United Nations Covenant on Human
Rights, Wis. L. Rev. 389-473, 623-656 (1951). Assoc. of the Bar of the City of New
York, Committee on Federal Legislation and Committee on International Law. See report
on "Joint Resolution Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
Relative to the Making of Treaties and Executive Agreements."
65 Proceedings of the American Bar Assoc. Section of International and Comparative
Law, 38 (Sept. 19, 1951).
See, The Bricker Amendment and The Proposed United Nations Human Rights
Covenant. Govt. Printing Office, Washington (1952).
50
